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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Wireless technology allows users to access information and services 
electronically irrespective of geographical position. Wireless technology has become 
tremendously popular due to its usage in various new fields of applications in the domain 
of networking. One such important field is Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET’s) where 
the nodes of the network do not have a specific infrastructure and they are connected 
dynamically in an arbitrary manner. Nodes within each other's radio range communicate 
directly via wireless links, while those that are further apart use other nodes as relays. 
Nodes in an ad-hoc network move dynamically; consequently keeping track of the 
network topology is a difficult task to achieve. There are many security issues associated 
with these kinds of networks. Security in wired networks can be applied to some extent 
but ad-hoc networks have their own vulnerabilities which cannot be always plugged
using wired security issues. Although security has been achieved to some extent, attacks 
keep increasing in the form of malicious nodes which may jam or spoof the channel or 
drop the packets.
Many routing protocols have been proposed for Ad hoc networks. Recently secure 
routing protocols have also been proposed [Zapata 02, Deng et al. 02]. If the introduction 
of secure mechanisms into routing degrades the performance significantly, the network 
designer has to evaluate the trade-offs in introducing security into routing. However, to 
2the best of our knowledge no one has investigated the overheads associated with 
introducing security into routing protocols. This thesis concentrates on one such routing 
protocol namely Ad hoc On Demand Vector Routing Protocol (AODV) [Perkins and 
Royer 99]. We compare AODV with secure AODV [Perkins and Royer 99] and study the
impact of security on routing overhead and on other performance metrics.
Thesis Outline
In chapter 2, a brief introduction to ad hoc networks is given along with their applications 
and characteristics. The AODV and the secure AODV routing protocols are discussed as 
a part of the literature review in chapter 3. Research objectives, scope and research 
methodology are described in chapter 4. The simulation model, implementation details 
and results are presented in chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and provides 
suggestions for future research.
3CHAPTER II
AD-HOC NETWORKS
An ad-hoc network is the cooperative engagement of a collection of mobile nodes 
without the required intervention of any centralized access point or existing infrastructure 
[Perkins and Royer 99]. The primary goal of ad-hoc networks is to set up 
communications for specialized, customized applications in areas where there is no 
infrastructure (e.g., battlefield, jungle operations), or where the infrastructure has failed 
(e.g., earthquake rescue) and most of the ad hoc applications are mobile. Typically ad hoc 
networks are set up for a limited amount of time. The protocols are tuned for the 
particular application (e.g., send a video stream across battlefield; find out if a fire has 
started in the forest etc.). The application may be mobile and the environment may 
change dynamically (figure 2.1.) and nodes communicate via wireless signals. Routing 
protocols help the nodes to communicate in order to accomplish the task.
4Figure 2.1. Ad-hoc network dynamic topology
2.1. Characteristics of Ad-hoc networks
Mobility:  Ad hoc nodes are mobile in nature; they dynamically move in a network in 
order to achieve a specific task. Rapid deployment in areas with no infrastructure often 
implies that the users must explore an area or form teams that in turn coordinate among 
themselves to create a task force or mission. The mobility model can have serious impact 
on routing which in turn may affect the performance of the network.
Multihopping: A multihop network is a network where the path from source to 
destination traverses several other nodes. Ad-hoc networks may exhibit multiple hops for 
obstacle negotiation and energy consumption. 
Energy Conservation: Mobile nodes in an ad hoc network may depend on batteries or 
other kinds of energy sources for their energy. Minimizing energy consumption in an ad-
5hoc network is one of the biggest challenges. Nodes which form a dominating set in a
network are chosen and energy consumption of nodes with in the particular set is 
optimized.
Security: Security is considered to be the primary concern in an ad hoc network. 
Providing a secured communication channel for nodes and keeping track of malicious or 
compromised nodes are major concerns in ad-hoc networks.
Scalability: In an ad-hoc network scalability can be handled using hierarchical 
construction. If mobility is limited then scalability can be easily handled using mobile IP 
and local handoff techniques. Some networks have a large number of nodes, and the 
techniques which are applicable for limited mobility do not work well in such cases. High 
mobility is one of the biggest challenges in ad-hoc design.
Routing Protocols: Routing protocols in an ad-hoc network are meant for communication 
between nodes. Node mobility is highly dynamic in ad hoc networks causing frequent 
route failures. A good routing protocol should adapt to a dynamic topology and it should 
be energy and bandwidth efficient. Routing protocols are primarily classified into Table 
driven and On demand routing protocols.
2.2. Applications
Ad-hoc networks do not require any infrastructural setup and there is no delay in 
setting up the network Data exchange takes a very minimal time. This feature makes ad-
hoc network suitable to situations such as battle field, rescue, jungle operations etc.,
6where there will be no fixed infrastructure. Figure 2.2 shows how an ad-hoc network is 
applicable to the above mentioned situations.
Figure 2.2. Example applications of MANET [from Deng et al. 02]
Ad-hoc Networks are developed to setup communications for specialized 
applications and they also provide instant connectivity across different communication 
devices irrespective of their location and underlying technology. The applications are 
mobile and they are required in situations where the infrastructure has failed. This is 
considered to be an important goal in networking and is shown for a military situation in 
figure 2.3.
7Figure 2.3. A typical ad-hoc network in a military situation [from Corson 02]
8CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter the Ad-hoc on Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) and secure 
AODV routing protocols are described in detail.
3.1. Ad-hoc on Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) [Perkins and Royer 99]
AODV is an on demand distance vector routing algorithm. In AODV each mobile 
host acts as a specialized router and routes are obtained as needed (i.e., on demand). 
Routes are maintained only between the nodes which need to communicate. It is suitable 
for dynamic self starting networks. It also provides loop free routes and even repairs 
broken links by notifying the nodes so that they can invalidate the route using the lost 
link. The overall bandwidth required for this protocol is smaller compared to other 
protocols since it doesn’t require any global periodic advertisements
Primary Objectives
AODV allows mobile nodes to obtain routes quickly for new destinations and it also 
allows mobile nodes to respond to changes in the network topology and link breakages in a 
timely manner. Nodes that are not in active communications neither participate in the routing 
exchanges nor maintain any routing information. Neighborhood detection can be 
9performed using local broadcasts such as “hello messages”. 
o Discovery packets are broadcasted by the source node when a necessity for a new route 
occurs.
o Local connectivity management and general topology maintenance should be properly 
distinguished.
o Changes in local connectivity management should be intimated to the neighboring 
nodes in a proper way.
Path discovery
Path discovery is initiated when a source node communicates with another node 
for which it has no routing information in its table. Each node maintains two counters,
node sequence number and broadcast ID. Path discovery is initiated by broadcasting 
route request (RREQ) packets to its neighbors. The source broadcasts the route request 
packets to its neighbors. The neighbors in turn sends the packets to their neighbors until 
the packet reaches an intermediate node which has recent route information for the 
destination or it till reaches the destination itself. Nodes discard the packets which they
had already seen. The RREQ packet contains the following fields:
<source_addr, source_sequence#, broadcast_id, dest_addr, dest_sequence#, hop_count>
The pair < source_addr, broadcast_id > uniquely identifies a RREQ packet. 
RREP packet contains the following fields:
<source_addr, dest_addr, dest_sequence#, hop_count, lifetime>
10
Each node either satisfies the RREQ packet by sending a route reply (RREP) back to the 
source (only when the RREQ packet reaches an intermediate node which has route to the
destination node) or rebroadcasts the RREQ packet to its neighbors after increasing the 
hop_count.
Reverse Path Setup
The source sequence number in RREQ maintains the freshness information about 
the reverse route to the source whereas the destination sequence number specifies the 
information of the fresh route to the destination which is accepted by the source. Reverse 
path is automatically setup when RREQ packet travels from source to various 
destinations. These reverse path entries are preserved until a reply is sent back to sender. 
                  Figure 3.1.  Propagation of a Route Request (RREQ) Packet
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Figure 3.2. Reverse Path Formation 
Forward path setup
A RREQ eventually reaches an intermediate node which has route information for 
the destination and the receiving node checks whether the RREQ packet has come 
through a bi-directional link and it compares the destination sequence number in its own 
route entry to that of in RREQ.  If the sequence number in RREQ is greater than that of 
the recorded sequence number then the intermediate node should not use its recorded 
route information to satisfy the RREQ. The intermediate node again rebroadcasts the
RREQ. The intermediate node can only respond to the RREQ if and only if the sequence 
number in its recorded route is greater than or equal to that of the sequence number in the
RREQ. If it does not have a route to the destination or if the RREQ is not processed 
previously then the node unicasts a route reply packet (RREP) back to its neighbor from 
which it received RREQ.
The RREP travels back to the source and it sets up a forward pointer along 
each traversed node. Once the source node receives the RREP it begins to forward the 
packets to the destination. If the source receives a RREP containing a greater sequence 
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number or contains the same sequence number but with a smaller hop count then it will 
update its routing information and uses the shorter route. The RREP also updates the 
timeout information for route entries from source to destination and keeps track of the 
latest destination sequence numbers for the requested destination.
Figure 3.3. Path Taken By the Route Reply (RREP) Packet
Figure 3.4. Forward Path setup
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Route Table Management
Route table entries carry other useful information which is known as soft state 
associated with the entry. Reverse path entries contain a timer route request expiration 
timer which is used to purge reverse path routing entries from the nodes which do not lie 
in the path from source to destination. Route caching timeout is one of the most important 
route table entries which are used to determine when the route becomes invalid. 
Neighbors in a route are considered active for a destination if and only if they originate or 
relay at least one packet in the recent active timeout period. A route table contains the 
following information:
 Destination IP address
 Number of Hops needed to reach destination(Hop count) 
 Next hop
 Destination sequence number
 Other state routing flags
 Network interface
 Lifetime of route
Whenever the source transmits data to the destination, the time limit is set to the current 
time plus the active route time out. If a new route is found then the source compares the 
destination sequence number of the new route to the destination sequence number in its 
routing table, if it is greater than the current one then the source assumes it to be the fresh 
route to destination and considers that route. If the newly offered route’s destination 
number is same as that of the current destination number then the hop-count will be 
14
checked, if the former one has smaller hop count then that route will be selected. Routing 
table will be updated if the source considers the new route with new destination sequence 
number and hop count.
Path Maintenance
 Ad hoc nodes are mobile in nature and the nodes which are not along active path 
do not affect routing to a particular destination. A problem occurs when the source node 
moves during an active session; the source node again reinitiates the route discovery 
process to get the new route to destination as the previous route is invalid. If the 
destination node moves then it sends a special RREP packet back to the affected source 
nodes. Periodic hello messages are transmitted in order to detect link failures. Link layer 
acknowledgements (LLACKS) are used to detect failures. If a node fails to send a packet 
to the next hop neighbor then it is also a sign of link failure. When the next hop is 
unreachable then the node propagates a RREP packet with a new sequence number (one 
greater than previous known sequence number) and hop count to infinity to all the 
neighbors. Once the source stops sending data packets, the links will time out and 
eventually be deleted from the intermediate node routing tables. If a link break occurs 
while the route is active, the node upstream of the break propagates a route error (RERR) 
message to the source node to inform it of the now unreachable destination(s). When the 
source node gets the packet it terminates the process and starts the route discovery
process again if it still needs route to destination. When the new route discovery process 
starts then a RREQ packet with a destination number one greater than the previous 
15
sequence number will be broadcasted in order to ensure that the source node builds a new 
route to destination.
Local Connectivity Management
Nodes can know about their neighbors when they receive a broadcast from their 
neighbors then they will update their local connectivity information with the details of the 
new neighbor. A node sends a hello message (special RREP) which contains its identity 
and sequence number to the neighboring nodes and the nodes update their local 
connectivity information to the node. If a node receives a new broadcast or hello message   
from a new node or doesn’t receive consecutive hello messages from its previous 
neighboring node then the local connectivity of the concerned node has changed. 
Summary
Compared to other protocols AODV acts as an excellent choice for establishment 
of ad-hoc networks. Routes are obtained only when needed and nodes store only the 
routes which are needed. It also reduces the memory requirements and needless 
duplications. When a link failure occurs intermediate nodes quickly intimate the source 
node by broadcasting a special packet known as RERR. The source node can freshly start 
the path discovery process if it still needs the route to destination. Loop free routes are 
obtained using destination sequence numbers. AODV is suitable for large scale ad-hoc 
networks as the network overhead in this protocol is fairly low when compared to other 
protocols. However nodes in the network are assumed to be friendly; this is assumed by 
the authors who proposed the protocol. The later part of this document deals with 
16
securing the AODV protocol and steps which are essential to handle malicious nodes in a 
network.
3.2. Secure AODV (SAODV) [Zapata 02]
The main objective of SAODV is to protect the routing information in AODV. 
Key management schemes are deployed in SAODV in order to securely verify the 
association between the address of a given ad hoc node and the public key of the node. 
This protocol is a pure extension to AODV by providing security features like integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation. How these security features are successfully 
incorporated in AODV is discussed in the later part of this document.
3.2.1. Security flaws of AODV
A malicious node say M can carry out the following attacks in AODV.
1. Source node can be impersonated by forging RREQ with its address as 
originator address.
2. Change the contents of RREQ such as hop count in order to increase the 
chances of being in the route between source and destination. It reduces the 
hop count and stays in the route and analyzes the communication in the route.
3. Destination node can be impersonated by forging a RREP with its address as 
destination address.
4. Can act as a network leader with the biggest sequence number and sending it 
to the neighbors. It can become a black hole to the entire sub network.
5. It can selectively forward certain RREQs and RREPs and avoid other packets.
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6. Forge a RERR message and avoids further communication between nodes as 
they cannot reach the destination with different sequence number.
7. Can send two different RREQs to the neighboring node with different
sequence numbers which creates delay in the communication.
Security Requirements
This section discusses the requirements which are essential to secure AODV. 
Authorization is considered to be the prime security service. A router needs to make two 
types of authorization decisions. If a routing update is obtained from outside then the 
router needs to decide whether to update its routing information or not. This is known as 
import authorization. If a router receives request from outside for routing information 
then it should decide whether to send the request to other nodes, which is called as export
authorization.
Authentication and integrity are other security services which are essential for 
authorization. Authentication enables a node to ensure the identity of the peer node it is 
communicating with. Integrity guarantees that the message sent is unaltered by any node 
in the network. Authentication and integrity in SAODV are achieved using digital 
signatures and message authentication codes. Non-repudiation is also essential in order to 
isolate misbehaving nodes. Non-repudiation ensures that the node which has sent the 
message cannot deny having sent the message. It helps in isolating the misbehaving 
nodes.  If a router X gets an erroneous message from router Y then router X can convince 
other nodes that Y is malicious node by using that message. The other nodes can isolate 
router Y and prevent router Y from participating in the communication. The requirements 
in SAODV are:
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o Import authorization: The route information in the route table of any node is 
authorized and if any malicious node lies about itself then other nodes can easily 
track such nodes and isolate them. 
o Source authentication: Source node should be verified in order to avoid other 
nodes to impersonate themselves as source nodes.
o Integrity: The routing information should be verified and there should be a way to 
ensure that it has not been altered.
o Data authentication can be ensured by combining the source authentication and 
integrity services.
Data messages can however be verified using a point to point security system like 
IPSec. Routing messages can be altered and sent to immediate neighbors so there should 
be a way to secure the routing messages. A routing message carries two types of 
information: mutable and non-mutable. Hop count in routing message is mutable 
information which can be unaltered using hash chains whereas non mutable information 
is secured using digital signatures. These techniques are mentioned below.
SAODV Hash chains
A malicious node can alter the hop count field in the RREQ packet which is 
broadcasted by the source node. This increases the chances of that malicious node to stay 
in the route path between source and destination and thus it can analyze the 
communication between them. Hop count is the only mutable information present in the 
routing message and by using SAODV hash chains this field can be secured. Each node 
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(either the intermediate or destination) which receive the packet can verify that the hop 
count has not been decremented by the attacker. A Hash chain is formed by applying a 
one way hash function repeatedly to the seed.
When a node originates a RREQ or RREP message it performs the following operations:
o Generates a random number (seed).
o Sets the Max_Hop_Count field to TTL value (Time to Live) value from the IP 
header.
Max_Hop_Count = TTL
o Sets the hash value to the seed value.
Hash = seed
o Sets the Hash_Function field to the identifier of the hash function that it is going 
to use.
Hash_Function = h
o Calculates Top_Hash by hashing seed Max_Hop_Count times.
Top_Hash =hMax_Hop_Count (seed)
Where:
- h is a hash function
- hi(x) is the result of applying the function h to x i times
   When a node receives a RREQ or RREP message
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o Applies the hash function h Maximum_Hop_Count minus Hop Count 
times to the value in the Hash field, and verifies that the resultant value is 
equal to the value contained in the Top_Hash filed.
Top_Hash = = hMax_Hop_Count-Hop_Count (Hash)
    If it is a valid message,
o The node applies the hash function to the hash value before forwarding it.
Hash = h(Hash)
The Hash_Function field indicates which hash function has to be used to compute 
the hash. The Hash function should not be changed because a different hash function 
gives a wrong hash. Hash_Function, Max_Hop_Count, Top_Hash and Hash fields are 
transmitted with the AODV message, in the signature extension. All the above fields are 
protected using digital signatures, except the Hash field in order to protect integrity.
SAODV Digital Signatures
A digital signature is a special case of message integrity code where the code can 
be generated by only one participant (source). RSA signature is one kind of digital 
signature algorithm in which the participant only knows the private key; the participant 
uses the private key to produce the signature. Any other participant (node) can verify the 
signature using the corresponding public key. In other words a message is signed using a 
private key and is again verified using the public key.
Digital signatures in SAODV protect the integrity of non-mutable in RREQ and 
RREP messages. That means they sign everything except the hop count from AODV 
message and hash from SAODV extension. The intermediate nodes in AODV can reply 
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to a RREQ message if they have a fresh enough route to destination. Applying digital 
signatures to such scenarios is difficult. This particular phenomenon in AODV makes it 
very efficient but securing it is complicated in nature. The RREP message generated by 
intermediate node should sign it on behalf of the final destination. Moreover it doesn’t 
have the signature for RREP. To overcome this problem there are two alternatives; first, 
if an intermediate node cannot sign the RREP message then it simply forwards the 
message to next node which may be the destination itself. The second alternative uses a 
different approach; if a node generates an RREQ message then it also includes RREP 
flags, the prefix size and the signature that can be used in order to reply a RREQ that asks 
for the node that originated the first RREQ. If an intermediate node generates a RREP 
message the life time of the route will be changed. So it should include both the new and 
old times so that the old time will be used to check the signature of the final destination. 
The two signature extension messages are called as RREQ and RREP double signature 
extensions. 
When a node receives a RREQ, it verifies the signature using the public key and if 
the message is genuine, the message is forwarded to the next node. After verification it 
creates and updates reverse route to that specific host and it stores the route too. If the 
RREQ is received with double signature extension then the node will store the signature 
for RREP and the life time in the route entry. An intermediate node should reply to 
RREQ only if it has fresh enough route to destination or else it should simply broadcast it 
to the next neighbor. If the destination itself gets the RREQ then it will reply with a 
RREP. This RREP will be sent back with a single signature extension. When a node 
receives RREP then it verifies the signature and after verification it will store the route 
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with the signature of RREP and life time. Using digital signatures attack scenarios 1 and 
3 from section 3.2.1 can be prevented. 
Key Management Service
Key management service is very essential as digital signatures are employed in 
SAODV to protect routing information and data traffic. A public key infrastructure is 
employed as it is very efficient in the distribution of keys and in the achievement of 
integrity and non-repudiation.  Efficient secret key schemes are employed in order to 
achieve more security and nodes authenticate each other and establish a shared session 
key. Each node will have a public/private key pair where the public keys are distributed 
to other nodes and the private keys are kept confidential by individual nodes. A trusted 
entity known as Certification Authority (CA) which can be used for key management 
holds the private/public key, with its public key known to every node and signs 
certificates binding public keys to nodes. The CA should stay online to reflect the current 
bindings, because the binding may change from time to time due to the dynamic topology 
of ad-hoc networks. A node should refresh its key pair as there are chances of brute-force 
attack on its private key. Using a single CA is very problematic in nature because if the 
CA is unavailable nodes cannot get the key pair.  Nodes cannot have the public keys of 
other nodes in order to establish secure communication between them.  If the CA gets 
compromised by revealing the private key to an adversary then the adversary can revoke 
the certificate and hinders the communication. A standard approach to improve 
availability of a service is replication. However, a naive replication of the CA makes the 
service more vulnerable: compromise of any single replica which possesses the service 
private key, could lead to collapse of the entire system. To solve this problem, trust is 
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distributed to a set of nodes by letting these nodes share the key management 
responsibility.
Figure 3.5. The configuration of a key management service 
The key management service consists of n servers. The service, as a whole, has a 
public/private key pair K/k. The public key K is known to all nodes in the network, 
whereas the private key k is divided into n shares s1, s2, . . . , sn, one share for each server. 
Each server i also have a public/private key pair Ki/ki and know the public keys of all 
nodes. [Hass 99]
Summary
Some of the attacks mentioned above are prevented using SAODV. Attack Scenarios 1, 
3, 4 and 6 from section 3.2.1 are prevented using digital signatures. Attack number 2 
from section 3.2.1 can be prevented by using hash chains. Attack number 5 from section 
3.2.1 is very difficult to identify and even transmission errors can give raise to such 
errors. There is one attack which SAODV cannot detect that is tunneling attack. In 
tunneling attack two malicious nodes can simulate that they have a link between them 
and continuously exchange messages between them. They could achieve certain traffic
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between them. These kinds of attacks can be detected using detection schemes. Hence 
there is a need for additional security which can prevent some attacks which cannot be 
identified using SAODV. Intrusion detection systems can act as a second line of defense 
for such attacks.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH STATEMENT AND METHODOLOGY
The overheads associated with secure routing protocols have not been 
investigated to the best of our knowledge. It is important to know the overheads and 
performance implications associated with secure routing so that appropriate protocols are 
implemented in the network. The main objective of this thesis is to find out how routing 
overhead and performance metrics gets affected if we provide security to a routing 
protocol. In this particular research AODV is chosen and a secured version of AODV 
(SAODV) has been implemented. These two protocols were discussed in detail and their 
performance evaluated.
4.1 Research Objectives
The purpose of the thesis is to develop AODV, SAODV and compare them by 
launching several attacks in the network. The performance of AODV and SAODV is 
evaluated under normal circumstances where there are no malicious nodes in the network 
and also under attack conditions where the network contains malicious nodes. The
protocols performance is measured using the performance metrics including Packet 
Delivery fraction, Normalized Routing Overhead, Average end to end delay of packets 
and routing overhead. To achieve this, the following objectives were identified:
1) To develop and implement the AODV routing protocol.
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2) To study the attacks which can be launched on AODV network such as attacks on 
routing messages and control messages. Attacks concerning the impersonation of 
nodes should also be identified.
3) To develop and implement the SAODV routing protocol which provides 
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation.
4) To study the impact of security on AODV routing and control messages.
5) To generate test scripts with and without attacks and test the above mentioned 
protocols performances on those test scripts.
6) To compare the performance of all the protocols with and without attacks in the 
network.
7) To suggest some measures to improvise these protocols.
4.2 Scope of the Research
The purpose of this research was to compare AODV, SAODV based on their
performance under various network conditions. It also compares the protocols and how 
they deal with various kinds of attacks in different network scenarios. The routing 
protocols were simulated in ns-2 with and without attacks.
4.3 Research Methodology
In order to accomplish the objectives mentioned above, the effort is divided into the 
following stages
Stage 1: The existing protocols were studied and explored in detail to gain the 
understanding of their purpose, strengths and limitations.
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Stage 2: Sample programs in ns-2 were studied and we developed some sample network 
scenarios based on the knowledge gained from the previous stage.
Stage 3: A Random way point model was developed in ns-2 to simulate the mobility of 
the nodes.
Stage 4: Different network scenarios such as a network with certain amount of nodes and 
nodes moving with different speeds were developed. 
Stage 5: The AODV routing protocol was developed in ns-2 and attacks on AODV 
routing protocol were studied and implemented.
Stage 6: SAODV algorithm was developed in ns-2. The protocols were tested under 
different network scenarios.
Stage 7: Finally, the performance metrics were used to evaluate the protocols. 
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CHAPTER V
SIMULATION MODEL
The network simulator ‘ns’ is a discrete event simulator targeted at networking 
research. It provides substantial support for simulation of TCP, routing, and multicast 
protocols over wired and wireless (local and satellite) networks. Node mobility, 
algorithm implementation and testing were done in ns-2 (Network Simulator). The speed 
at which a node moves in an ad-hoc network, pause time and the size of network (number 
of nodes) were the changing factors in the simulation runs. A detailed simulation model 
based on ns-2 was used in the evaluation. The Monarch research group at Carnegie-
Mellon University developed support for simulating multihop wireless networks 
complete with physical, data link, and medium access control (MAC) layer models on ns-
2. The Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 for wireless LANs was 
used as the MAC layer protocol. An unslotted carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) 
technique with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) is used to transmit the data packets. The 
radio model uses characteristics similar to a commercial radio interface, Lucent’s 
WaveLAN. WaveLAN is modeled as a shared-media radio with a nominal bit rate of 2 
Mb/s and a nominal radio range of 250 m.
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5.1 Traffic and Mobility Models
Traffic and mobility models employed is the same as in [Das 00] which is a 
common test scenario used by other performance comparison studies [Boukerche 04, 
Broch 98]. Continuous bit rate (CBR) traffic sources will be used. With CBR pattern, 
fixed size data packets were sent at roughly the same time interval and not affected by the 
network flow control. Thus with a CBR pattern, the performance of packet delivery is 
mostly determined by the performance of the routing protocols. The source-destination 
pairs are spread randomly over the network. The number of source-destination pairs and 
the packet sending rate in each pair is varied to change the traffic load in the network. For 
small traffic loads in networks of size 10, 20, 30, 40 nodes the packet rate is 4 
packets/sec. Only 512-byte data packets are used. The mobility model uses the random 
waypoint model [Broch 98] in a rectangular field. The field configuration is: 1500 m x 
500 m. Here, each packet starts its journey from a random location to a random 
destination with a randomly chosen speed (uniformly distributed between 1–20 m/s). 
Once the destination is reached, another random destination is targeted after a pause. The 
pause time, which affects the relative speeds of the mobiles, is varied. Simulations are
carried out for 900 seconds. Identical mobility and traffic scenarios are used across 
protocols to gather fair results.
Three important performance metrics were evaluated:
Packet delivery fraction: The ratio of the data packets delivered to the destinations 
to those generated by the CBR sources.
Average end-to-end delay of data packets: This includes all possible delays 
caused by buffering during route discovery latency, queuing at the interface 
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queue, retransmission delays at the MAC, and propagation and transfer times.
Normalized routing load: The number of routing packets transmitted per data 
packet delivered at the destination. Each hop-wise transmission of a routing 
packet is counted as one transmission.
The first two metrics are the most important for best-effort traffic. The routing load 
metric evaluates the efficiency of the routing protocol. These metrics are not completely 
independent. For example, lower packet delivery fraction means that the delay metric is 
evaluated with fewer samples. Path lengths play a vital role, the longer the path lengths, 
the higher the probability of a packet drop. Thus, with a lower delivery fraction, samples 
are usually biased in favor of smaller path lengths and therefore have less delay. 
5.2 Simulation Implementation details:
The AODV routing protocol is already implemented in ns-2. We chose the AODV-UU 
protocol [UU 05] implemented by Uppsala University to incorporate security features 
like hash chains and digital signatures in order to realise the secured version of the 
AODV routing protocol. Hash chains were implemented in order to achieve the integrity 
of contents (to secure the mutable information) and digital signatures were used to protect 
the non-mutable information in RREQ and RREP packets. The intermediate node cannot
send the RREP back to the node from which it received the RREQ. This is done to ensure 
that only single signature extensions can be used. So the destination can only send the 
RREP back to its previous node. This helps in fair comparison of AODV and SAODV 
routing protocols. The following were some of the attacks which were implemented in 
the simulation work.
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1) Nodes which can send fake RREQ and RREP packets were created. These nodes 
have the different non mutable information and this information can be verified 
using the digital signature generated by the source node. This non mutable 
information can be different destination sequence number or different addresses
of the source node.
2) Nodes which impersonate themselves as source and destination were also created.
In these types of attacks the malicious nodes claim themselves as the source nodes 
and try to initiate the path discovery process by sending the fake RREQ packets to 
the neighbors. Since the nodes have the public key they can verify the non 
mutable information using the digital signature and avoid communication with 
them. Malicious nodes can also claim themselves as destination nodes with the 
highest sequence numbers. In order to prevent such attacks the sequence numbers 
of such nodes are assigned a very high value which is practically not possible and 
when the intermediate nodes try to communicate with them they will have a look 
at the value of the sequence numbers and simply stops communication with them. 
Intermediate nodes can also verify the destination node by using the digital 
signature.
3) Nodes which selectively forward some RREQ and RREP packets and drop the 
remaining packets were simulated. Simulating these kinds of attacks is a daunting 
task. A simple scenario is followed to handle these attacks. Every node should 
send at least a fixed number of hello messages to the neighboring nodes within a 
time frame. The neighboring nodes will keep track of the number of messages that 
they are receiving within the given time frame. If the number of messages are less 
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than the threshold then it is assumed that the attacking node is not forwarding the 
messages. These nodes are eliminated from the routing path. 
4) A black hole situation is simulated. These nodes never forward any kind of 
packets which they receive and these attacks can be handled by applying the 
simple rule suggested above with a small change. These nodes receive the hello 
messages from the neighboring nodes but they won’t return the reply to the 
neighboring nodes. 
5) Nodes which can modify the routing information (mutable) were created. Hop 
count is the only mutable information present in the routing messages and this 
information can be verified using the hash chains. The hash function is applied 
and if it returns the wrong value then that node is considered to be a malicious 
node. 
6) Finally the secured version of AODV is implemented so as to handle all the above 
mentioned attacks.
5.3 Simulation Results:
The simulation was carried out using 10, 20 and 30 nodes with the following 
network conditions. 
 The speed is randomly chosen between 1 and 20m/s.
 The total duration for one simulation is 900s. 
 The pause times were 0, 30, 60, 120, 300, 600 and 900 seconds. At 900 seconds 
there is no mobility which  means that the nodes are in a stationary condition. 
 Rectangular area of 1500m x 500m was chosen and the protocols were tested 
using different conditions which as mentioned above.
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For convenience protocols are represented in the following abbreviated forms:
 SAODV – Secure Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol 
 SAODV-B – SAODV with Bad nodes. The percentage of bad nodes were varied 
from 10%-50% out of the total population of nodes.
 AODV – Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol
 AODV-B – AODV with bad nodes and the bad node population is same as that of 
in SAODV-B.
Each data point in the graph was an average of 5 simulations. Attack types and malicious 
nodes population were varied for each simulation and an average of all the results were 
taken into consideration.
10 NODES:
Routing overhead vs. Pause time for 10 nodes:
Routing overhead is the number of routing packets generated during the course of 
simulation. The below graph shows how many routing packets were generated by 
each protocol.
 Due to the additional security the routing overhead for SAODV, SAODV with 
bad nodes (SAODV-B) is obviously more compared to AODV. 
 The routing overhead for AODV with bad nodes is high due to continuous route 
failures which occur due to the bad nodes. AODV-B therefore produces more 
routing packets than the normal AODV protocol.
 Routing overhead for SAODV-B is a little bit higher than SAODV due to extra 
routing communications needed to handle the bad nodes. 
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Figure 5.1. Routing overhead vs. Pause time (10 nodes). 
 SAODV-B requires more routing packets since it needs to avoid the bad nodes 
which try to spoof the neighboring node to stay in the path by altering the mutable 
information present in the routing packet. 
Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause time for 10 Nodes:
Packet delivery fraction (PDF) is the percentage ratio of number of data packets sent 
by the source to that of number of packets received by the destination. The below 
graph shows the percentage of packets generated by the source that are delivered to 
the destination for the four routing protocols.
 PDF is high for AODV compared to other protocols. Approximately 80% of 
packets were delivery from source to destination at a pause time of 0 seconds. 
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 With increase in the pause time the PDF decreased as the nodes have to stay at a 
place for more time in their journey.  One reason might be the link failures which 
occur at these high pause times. Due to the static nature and sparseness (low 
density of nodes) of the network, some nodes remain disconnected from the 
destination for long periods of time. 
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Figure 5.2. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause time (10 nodes).
 For AODV-B the PDF is the least of the four protocols due to the attacks in the 
networks. The intermediate bad nodes may not deliver the packets which are 
scheduled to the destination. They simply drop the packets.
 SAODV outperformed SAODV-B in delivering the packets to the destination. 
SAODV-B gives a worst case performance at pause time of 600s. SAODV 
performed very well when there is minimal movement in the nodes.
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Average End-end delay vs. Pause time for 10 Nodes
This includes all possible delays caused by buffering during route discovery latency,
queuing at the interface queue, retransmission delays at the MAC, and propagation 
and transfer times. The below graph shows us how this metric gets affected when the 
routing protocols were simulated.
 AODV-B has given worst performance due to the delays caused by the route 
failures, route discovery process etc. 
 SAODV performed very well in this scenario compared to AODV and SAODV-B 
protocols. 
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Figure 5.3. Avg. End-end delay vs. Pause time (10 nodes).
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 At pause time of 900 seconds all the protocols have almost zero avg. end to end 
delay as there will not be any movement in nodes. 
 At pause time of 120 seconds AODV-B has the highest avg. end-end delay. More 
delays might have occurred at that particular event of simulation due to some 
delays that can be attributed to the link failures and connection patterns in the 
network.
Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause time for 10 Nodes:
This is the number of routing packets transmitted per data packet delivered at the 
destination. Each hop-wise transmission of a routing packet is counted as one
transmission.
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Figure 5.4. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause time ( 10 Nodes). 
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 Normalized routing overhead is the number of routing packets transmitted for one 
data packet that reaches the destination. 
 AODV outperformed all the other protocols since it consumed minimal routing 
packets and is clearly evident from figure 5.1.
 SAODV performed slightly better than SAODV-B in this case. 
 AODV-B gives the worst performance due to the effect of bad nodes.
20 NODES:
Routing overhead vs. Pause time for 20 nodes:
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Figure 5.5. Routing overhead vs. Pause time (20 nodes). 
 
 The number of routing packets generated by AODV-B is high compared to other 
39
protocols, particularly at higher pause times. This can be explained due to the 
increase in the population of nodes/bad nodes.
 SAODV and AODV-B on an average generated same number of routing packets. 
 AODV consumed minimal number of routing packets. After 60 seconds pause 
time the graph is almost linear.
 During the initial period of simulation SAODV-B consumed more routing packets 
due to continuous mobility of nodes and local connectivity changing rapidly at 
those high speeds.
Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause time for 20 Nodes:
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Figure 5.6.  Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause time (20 Nodes). 
 AODV outperformed the other protocols in PDF and approximately 90% of 
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packets were delivered for pause times 30 and 120 seconds respectively. But the 
performance gradually decreased thereafter and reached the lowest of 50% at 900
seconds. This may be due to the lack of mobility and sparseness of the network. 
 Due to availability of more nodes and more connections between the source and 
destination pairs the PDF has increased compared to that of the 10 nodes network.
 SAODV performed well when compared to SAODV-B in most of the scenarios. 
 AODV-B has the worst performance in this scenario. Most of the data packets 
were lost in their journey to the destination.
Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 20 nodes:
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Figure 5.7. Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time (20 nodes). 
 AODV-B performance in this case is very inconsistent and the delay at pause time 
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0 seconds is very high and gradually decreases thereafter.
 All the other protocols have performed well in their limitations. AODV has high 
average end-end delay ratio at pause times 0 seconds and 30 seconds and delay is 
reduced in the later course of the simulation.
 The secured protocols performed well in this case. 
Normalized Routing Overhead (Packets) vs. Pause time (Seconds) for 20 Nodes:
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Figure 5.8. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause time (20 Nodes). 
 
 AODV-B consumes a lot of routing packets. It consumed approximately 800, 
1200 routing packets for each data packet sent to the destination at pause times 
60 seconds and 900 seconds. 
 All the other protocols performed well and consumed minimal routing packets to 
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that of data packets sent.
30 NODES:
Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes:
Routing Overhead vs PauseTime for 30 Nodes
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Figure 5.9: Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time (30 Nodes). 
 
 The number of routing packets generated by SAODV-B is high compared to other 
protocols. This is due to the fact of malicious nodes and the protocol is tuned in 
such a fashion that it prevents the malicious nodes participating in active 
communication. 
 AODV consumed the fewest number of routing packets compared to other 
protocols. At 60 seconds pause time it consumed more number of packets and at 
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pause times 30, 600, 900 seconds it consumed fewer number of packets compared 
to that of at 60 seconds. .
Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes:
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Figure 5.10: Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time (30 Nodes). 
 
 AODV performed better compared to the other protocols. The PDF on average
shows that approximately 90% of packets were delivered in all the cases. With 
increase in the node population, the PDF improved is evident from the above 
graph. Due to the availability of more nodes and more connections between the 
source and destination pairs the PDF has increased compared to that of a 20 node 
network.
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 SAODV performed slightly better than SAODV-B in most of the scenarios. 
 AODV-B had the worst performance in this case. Most of the data packets were 
lost in their journey to the destination.
Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes:
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Figure 5.11: Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time (30 Nodes). 
 
 AODV-B routing protocol’s performance has not improved and it is obviously 
due to bad nodes in the network which can corrupt the routing information. 
Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause time for 30 Nodes:
 Normalizing routing overhead is still high for AODV-B even under these network 
conditions.
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Normalized Routing Overhead vs PauseTime for 30 Nodes
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Figure 5.12: Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause time ( 30 Nodes).
 All the other protocols have performed better than AODV-B in this case. It is 
clearly seen that for this particular performance metric these protocols were 
behaving as expected.
40 Nodes:
Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 40 Nodes:
 The number of routing packets generated by SAODV-B is high compared to other 
protocols. This is due to the fact of malicious nodes and the protocol prevents the 
malicious nodes from participating in active communication. 
46
Routing Overhead vs PauseTime for 40 Nodes 
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Figure 5.13: Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time (40 Nodes).
 AODV consumed the fewest number of routing packets compared to other 
protocols at 900 seconds. Initially the consumption of routing packets by AODV 
is more since due to high mobility of nodes and the consumption decreases as the 
pause times are increased. 
Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 40 Nodes:
 The best performance for AODV is achieved in this scenario at 900 seconds of 
pause time. The PDF at 900 seconds is 99% and almost all the packets which 
were sent by the source were received at the destination. This is the best result 
which was observed and PDF on an average for AODV is approximately 90% for 
the entire simulations.
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Packet Delivery Fraction vs PauseTime for 40 Nodes 
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Figure 5.14: Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time (40 Nodes).
 SAODV performed somewhat better than SAODV-B in most of the scenarios. 
 AODV-B had the worst performance. On average only 10% of the packets 
reached the destination.
 SAODV protocol has achieved its best performance of 99% even with the high 
routing overhead when there is no mobility in the network. It performed better 
than SAODV with malicious nodes in all the pause time scenarios. From this 
study it was evident that SAODV’s performance is good when there is no 
mobility and the network is dense so that there are more connection pairs.
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Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 40 Nodes:
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Figure 5.15: Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time (40 Nodes). 
 
 Delays for AODV-B routing protocol is the least since it could send only very 
limited number of data packets to the destination. 
Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause time for 40 Nodes:
 Normalizing routing overhead is still high for AODV-B even under these network 
conditions. In some scenarios the numbers of packets sent were totally lost.
 AODV consumed fewer routing packets for each data packet which was sent to 
the destination as can be clearly seen from the above.
 SAODV consumed less routing packets when compared to SAODV-B.
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Normalized Routing Overhead vs PauseTime for 40 Nodes 
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Figure 5.16: Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause time (40 Nodes). 
 
All the remaining graphs which were used in the simulation part are included in the 
appendix section. The performances of the protocols were studied at two different speeds, 
namely, 1 m/s and 20 m/s for pause times 0, 30, 60, 120, 300, 600 and 900 seconds 
respectively.
In the above graphs for different number of nodes, the malicious nodes percentage varied 
from 10% to 50% of the total node population. The average of all the values was taken 
into consideration for the above graphs. 
We next considered the performance of SAODV and AODV under different percentages 
of malicious node populations. For this simulation, network constraints we re: 
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 Number of nodes : 30
 Number of malicious nodes : 5, 10, 15
 Pause times: 0, 30, 60, 120, 300, 600, 900 seconds.
 Network area: A rectangular field of 1500m x 500m.
For convenience protocols are represented in the following abbreviated forms: 
 SAODV-5 – Secure Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol with 
5 malicious nodes out of the total 30 nodes 
 SAODV-10 – SAODV with 10 malicious nodes. 
 SAODV-15 – SAODV with 15 malicious nodes. 
 AODV-5 – Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol with 5 
malicious nodes
 AODV-10 – AODV with 10 malicious nodes.
 AODV-15 – AODV with 15 malicious nodes.
30 Nodes:
Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes:
 Routing overhead for SAODV with 15 malicious nodes was observed to be high 
because the more malicious nodes in the network, more work is needed in order to 
avoid the malicious nodes from participating in the routing. AODV has almost the 
same routing overhead for all the malicious node populations since it doesn’t 
employ any measures to prevent them from participating.
 SAODV with 5 and 10 malicious nodes respectively has almost the same routing 
overhead. 
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Routing Overhead vs PauseTime for 30 Nodes 
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Figure 5.17: Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time (30 Nodes)
Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes:
 SAODV-5 performed well in this case compared to SAODV-10 and SAODV-15 
routing protocols. PDF ratio decreases if there are more malicious nodes in the 
network. The same principle is applied to the AODV routing protocols.
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Packet Delivery Fraction vs PauseTime for 30 Nodes 
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Figure 5.18: Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time (30 Nodes)
Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes:
 Delays for the SAODV routing protocol are very high compared to AODV 
routing protocols since AODV routing protocols with malicious nodes can send 
very few number of data packets to the destination. 
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Average End-End Delay vs PauseTime for 30 Nodes 
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Figure 5.19: Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time (30 Nodes).
Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause time for 30 Nodes:
 The Normalizing routing overhead is high for AODV routing protocols with 
malicious nodes as the number of data packets reaching the destination is very 
low. In some scenarios the numbers of packets sent were totally lost.
 SAODV routing protocols with malicious nodes performed better than AODV 
routing protocols with malicious nodes since more packets were reaching the 
destination in SAODV routing protocols when compared to AODV routing 
protocols with malicious nodes. This is clearly seen in the below graph.
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Normalized Routing Overhead vs PauseTime for 30 Nodes 
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Figure 5.20: Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause time (30 Nodes).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
 Out of the four protocols AODV has clearly emerged as a winner in performance
when operating in the absence of malicious nodes. AODV is followed by SAODV, 
SAODV-B and AODV-B. AODV-B gave the worst performance in all aspects if 
malicious nodes were present and attacking. Secured routing protocols have more 
overhead than normal routing protocols as shown in the simulation when considering 
different conditions in the network. If security is not enabled then some heavy packet loss 
due to bad nodes was experienced in the network, particularly in the case of AODV-B. 
This thesis also investigated how the performance metrics were affected when the 
malicious node population varied. Safe communication is guaranteed between source and 
destination if security is enabled in the network. In a secured network, malicious nodes 
cannot participate in the active communication between source and destination.
Although SAODV can prevent many attacks, there are some attacks where 
SAODV will fail. A second line of defense is therefore needed to handle selfish nodes, 
spoofing and tunneling attacks etc., which cannot be prevented using SAODV. A real 
time intrusion detection protocol should be developed to monitor the changes that occur 
in the network and it should respond to the appropriate attacks. As future work a real time 
intrusion detection system should be developed and its performance should be compared 
with the secured and the normal versions of the routing protocols.
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APPENDIX A - FIGURES
Routing Overhead Vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes (Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.1. Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes (Speed = 1 m/s)
Routing Overhead Vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes (Speed =20 m/s)
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Figure A.2 Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes (Speed = 20 m/s)
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Packet Delivery Fraction Vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes (Speed =1 
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Figure A.3 Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed = 1 m/s)
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Figure A.4. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes
(Speed = 20 m/s)
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Average End-End Delay Vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes (Speed =1 
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Figure A.5 Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.6. Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed =20 m/s)
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Normalized Routing Overhead Vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.7. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed =1 m/s)
Normalized Routing Overhead Vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed =20 m/s)
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Figure A.8. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed =20 m/s)
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Routing Overhead Vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes (Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.9. Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes 
(Speed = 1 m/s)
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Figure A.10. Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes
(Speed = 20 m/s)
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Packet Delivery Fraction Vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes (Speed =1 
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Figure A.11. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes
 (Speed = 1 m/s)
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Figure A.12. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes
(Speed = 20 m/s)
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Average End-End Delay Vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes (Speed =1 
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Figure A.13 Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes
(Speed =1 m/s)
Average End-End Delay Vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes (Speed =20 
m/s)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 30 60 120 300 600 900
Pause Time (Seconds)
Av
er
ag
e 
En
d-
En
d 
De
la
y 
(S
ec
o
n
ds
)
SAODV
SAODV-B
AODV
AODV-B
Figure A.14. Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes
 (Speed =20 m/s)
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Normalized Routing Overhead Vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes 
(Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.15. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes 
(Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.16. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 20 Nodes 
(Speed =20 m/s)
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Routing Overhead Vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes (Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.17. Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes 
(Speed = 1 m/s)
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Figure A.18. Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes 
(Speed = 20 m/s)
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m/s)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 30 60 120 300 600 900
Pause Time (Seconds)
Pa
ck
et
 
De
liv
er
y 
Fr
ac
tio
n
 
(P
ac
ke
ts
)
SAODV
SAODV-B
AODV
AODV-B
Figure A.19. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes 
(Speed = 1 m/s)
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Figure A.20. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes 
(Speed = 20 m/s)
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Figure A.21. Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes 
(Speed = 1 m/s)
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Figure A.22. Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes 
(Speed = 20 m/s)
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Figure A.23. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes
(Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.24. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 30 Nodes
(Speed =20 m/s)
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Routing Overhead Vs. Pause Time for 40 Nodes (Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.25. Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed = 1 m/s)
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Figure A.26. Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 40 Nodes 
(Speed = 20 m/s)
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Figure A.27. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 40 Nodes 
(Speed = 1 m/s)
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Figure A.28. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Pause Time for 40 Nodes 
(Speed = 20 m/s)
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Figure A.29. Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.30. Average End-End Delay vs. Pause Time for 10 Nodes 
(Speed =20 m/s)
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Figure A.31. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 40 Nodes
(Speed =1 m/s)
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Figure A.32. Normalized Routing Overhead vs. Pause Time for 40 Nodes
(Speed =20 m/s)
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